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Over the past century in the United States and abroad, the word
"refugee" has accumulated a variety of meanings. To some, a refugee may
simply be someone who comes to the US seeking a better life. To others, a
refugee is someone who specifically escapes a war-tom country, coming to
the US in hopes of simply surviving. A significant portion of the
population may consider the word "refugee" to be a form of self-identity,
for it defines why they no longer reside in their home country. Whatever
one's personal definition of "refugee" may be, most would agree that US
refugee and asylum law have played a pivotal role in forming American
society over the past half century.
The United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,
entered into force in 1951, endorsed a single definition of "refugee."'
According to the Convention, a refugee is "someone who is unable or
unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group, or political opinion."2  The Convention
incorporated temporal and geographic restrictions on refugee status, which
were removed by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees when it
was entered into force in 1967.3 The Refugee Act of 1980 adopted this
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1. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6269, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; United Nations Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol].
2. Refugee Convention, supra note 1.
3. Protocol, supra note 1.
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international legal definition into U.S. law.4 In passing this act, Congress
created the first statutory refugee and asylum procedures in the US that
sought to end the previous ad hoc treatment of refugee and asylum
applications.s Congress intended to bring US refugee law into conformity
with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
to which the US assented in 1968.6
Since the passage of the Refugee Act, American refugee and asylum
law has continued to evolve, both through the courts and through
legislation. Although "asylum status" and "refugee status" are phrases
commonly used interchangeably, a critical distinction between them is the
physical location of the individual when applying for protection from
persecution. This distinction indicates two procedural routes through
which one may apply for protection.8 In reaction to the events of
September 11, 2001, Congress enacted the REAL ID Act of 2005 ("the
Act") as part of a series of statutes designed to aid in fighting terrorism.9
Among other things, the Act amended the Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA") in several respects, including a change to the standard for
rendering credibility determinations in administrative proceedings and the
federal courts of appeals.10  These amendments expanded the bases
immigration judges may rely on in discounting the veracity of an asylum
applicant's claim." Given the need to comply with the international
obligation to ensure safety and protection to those legitimately fleeing
persecution, as articulated in the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, 12 it is no surprise that the Act's amendments to the
INA have been viewed with much scholarly criticism.'3
This note will address various issues inherent to the REAL ID Act and
will analyze how to best resolve those issues. Due to the many challenges
that asylum seekers face in telling their stories, the Act should be amended
4. William Sanchez & Adalsinda Lomangino, Political Asylum and Other Forms of Relief
66 FLA. B.J. 18, (1992).
5. Id
6. INS. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 450-51 (1987).
7. RICHARD A. BOSWELL, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
299 (4th ed. 2010).
8. Those seeking asylum may apply under Section 208 of the INA, while those seeking
refugee protection may apply under Section 207 of the INA. Each section specifies its different
requirements and standards that applicants must meet.
9. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of REAL ID Act of
2005, 11 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1 (2006).
10. Scott Rempell, Credibility Assessments and the REAL ID Act's Amendments to
Immigration Law, 44 TEX. INT'L L.J. 185, 195 (2008).
11. Id.
12. Protocol, supra note 1. The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees was
amended and updated by the Protocol adopted in 1967.
13. Id.
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so that a trier of fact may not consider immaterial inconsistencies as part of
the "totality of the circumstances" test in making a credibility
determination. Further, a trier of fact should be permitted to request
corroboration only when an applicant is deemed insufficiently credible, and
the corroboration pertains to facts central to the claim. Part I will provide a
general overview of US asylum law and will discuss the integral role of
corroboration and credibility in asylum adjudication. Part II will discuss
the difficulties facing asylum seekers in adequately presenting their cases in
administrative proceedings. Part III will describe the Act and its effects on
US asylum law. Finally, Part IV will offer amendments to the Act to
address the negative impact it has had on legitimate asylum seekers.
I. Role of Credibility and Corroboration in Asylum
Proceedings
Asylum is discretionary relief available to any undocumented person
who is physically present in the US or who arrives at a US port of entry and
qualifies as a "refugee" under the INA.14 An undocumented person who is
in the United States and not in the midst of removal proceedings may file an
affirmative application for asylum once he is in the US or at the US
border.15  Alternatively, an application for asylum can be made
"defensively" in the context of a removal proceeding.16 The INA defines a
refugee as any person who is unable or unwilling to return to any country of
such person's nationality (or any country in which such person last
habitually resided, in the case of such person having no nationality)
"because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion." 7 To qualify as a refugee, an individual can demonstrate
that he has suffered past persecution, creating a presumption of a well-
founded fear of future persecution.' 8 This presumption can be rebutted,
however, if the government can prove changed circumstances in the
individual's country of origin, in the individual himself, or any other
circumstances which would render the person no longer at risk of
persecution.' 9 Alternatively, the government may also show that internal
relocation would allow the individual to escape persecution.20 An individual
14. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 428 (emphasizing the discretionary nature of asylum); 8
U.S.C. § 1158 (2009).
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) (2009).
16. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2009).
17. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A) (2009).
18. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1); Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1084-85 (7th Cir. 2004).
19. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).
20. Id.
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can establish a well-founded fear of future persecution in cases where there
has been past persecution, or where there is objectively reasonable evidence
that the person would be at risk upon return.21
Any individual seeking asylum must not only prove past persecution
or a well-founded fear of future persecution; he must also show that such
harm was "on account of' one of the five protected grounds: race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.2 2
This is frequently referred to as the "nexus" requirement. 23 In addition to
meeting the nexus requirement, an asylum seeker must also show that the
alleged harm is being inflicted by the government, or alternatively, that the
government is unwilling or unable to protect from such harm.2 4  If an
individual proves all of these elements, asylum protection may be granted at
the Attorney General's discretion.2 5
An applicant for asylum has the burden of proof in establishing that he
qualifies as a refugee under section 101(a)(42) of the Act. 2 6 A credibility
assessment, which may be made by an adjudicator in each case, is a
determination of whether an asylum seeker's testimony should be accepted
as evidence in determining whether he has met the burden of proof to show
that he is a refugee.27 Thus, credibility plays an extremely important role in
immigration proceedings. In fact, the credibility assessment is often the
single most important step in determining whether an individual will be
returned to his home country.28 The testimony of an applicant, by itself,
may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof if it is deemed credible. 2 9
Immigration judges must evaluate each applicant's credibility because
direct verification of an alien's testimony is typically very difficult and
often impossible.30 Many victims of the most severe human rights
violations are not likely to be able to obtain specific evidence to support
their claim.3 '
In making a credibility determination, an immigration judge ("IJ") just
assess the internal consistency, details, and plausibility of an applicant's
claim.32 An adverse credibility determination can be based on a wide array
21. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2) (2009).
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)(A) (2008).
23. BOSWELL, supra note 7.
24. Cardoza-Fonseca, supra note 14; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i) (2009).
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) (2009).
26. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2009).
27. Michael Kagan, Is Truth In the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility Assessment in
Refugee Status Determination, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 367, 371 (2003).
2 8. Id.
29. Id.
30. Capric, 355 F.3d at 1085.
31. Kagan, supra note 27.
32. Capric, 355 F.3d at 1085.
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of factors, including hesitant and evasive demeanor, the absence of
corroborating evidence that the IJ found was reasonably available, and
discrepancies between testimony and other evidence. 3 3  The Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA") and federal courts of appeals generally afford
significant deference to an IJ's credibility determinations, since the IJ in
each case has a unique opportunity to "subjectively and intuitively"
evaluate the applicant's demeanor in person. 34 This deference places great
importance on an IJ's evaluation of an applicant's credibility.
If the IJ finds the applicant's testimony to be incredible, then the
applicant must provide corroborating evidence to support his claim.35
Under the Act, an IJ can also request corroborating evidence even when he
finds the applicant to be sufficiently credible. 36  Thus, without credible
testimony or corroboration, an asylum seeker will not be able to meet his
burden of proof and his claim will be denied.37 Negative credibility
assessments are a leading reason for denial of asylum claims in most
refugee status determination systems.38
II. Difficulties Facing Asylum Seekers
While the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
("UNHCR") recognizes that each nation must develop its own law and
procedures, the UNHCR has always encouraged "a generous asylum policy
in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
Declaration on Territorial Asylum." 39 The 1951 Refugee Convention was
designed in large part to promote "the principle that human beings shall
enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination."4o Since
genuine victims of human rights violations are unlikely to have access to
extensive evidence of the harm they have suffered, the burden of proof
placed on asylum seekers must take into consideration the innumerable
barriers they face. This is necessary in order to satisfy the Convention's
purpose in allowing human beings to enjoy fundamental rights and
freedoms.4 1 This is a "protection-oriented" approach that allows legitimate
33. Mao Ye v. Mukasey, 298 Fed. Appx. 112, 113 (2nd Cir. 2008).
34. Id. (citing Tu Lin v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 395, 400 (2nd Cir. 2006).
35. Capric, 355 F3d at 1086.
36. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 101; INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii); 8 U.S.C. §
I 158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
37. Id.
38. Kagan, supra note 27, at 368.
39. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees [UNHCR], Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter UN Handbook], available at
http://www.unhcr.org/3d58el3b4.html.
40. Protocol, supra note 1, at Preamble.
41. Kagan, supra note 27, at 371.
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asylum seekers to gain protection without having to meet a difficult, and
sometimes impossible, burden of proof.42 While some may condemn this
rule as setting a low standard of proof for applicants to meet, such approach
is simply taking the sensitive and difficult nature of asylum adjudication
into account.
This protective concept is further embodied by the "benefit of the
doubt" rule.4 3 The benefit of the doubt rule serves an important function in
asylum proceedings, given the tremendous difficulties that many applicants
face in presenting their cases to an adjudicator. Furthermore, credibility
determinations in asylum hearings can be arduous to make, due to factors
such as "differences in cultural norms, the effect of an asylum seeker's past
traumatic experiences and flight on her ability to recall events,44 language
barriers, the adversarial nature of the hearing, the asylum seeker's limited
access to legal counsel, and the adjudicator's sometimes inaccurate
perceptions of foreign culture and politics."45
A protection-oriented approach would take into account the trials and
tribulations that victims of persecution face. Circumstances among asylum
seekers greatly vary, so the meaning of "persecution" has been one of many
topics of debate among scholars. To present day, there is no universally
46
accepted definition of persecution. In INS v. Stevic, the Supreme Court
stated that "persecution" for purposes of refugee law is considered to be "a
seemingly broader concept than threats to life or freedom."47 Although the
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
("UN Handbook") is not binding on US courts, it is considered "significant
guidance" in construing the Refugee Act of 1980.48 The UN Handbook
notes that a threat to life or freedom on account of one of the five grounds
recognized by the INA always amounts to persecution.49 While physical
torture and harm usually constitute persecution, actions that do not result in
actual physical harm may also constitute persecution.o In Begzatowski v.
INS, the Seventh Circuit noted that to sustain an asylum application, the
harm suffered must amount to more than mere harassment.51 The court
42. Kagan, supra note 27, at 371.
43. Id.
44. Under case law, the definition of "persecution" has come to include "acts as severe as
imprisonment and torture as well as less harmful acts such as confiscation of property." Christian
A. Fundo, Book Note, Toward A More Individualized Assessment of Changed Country Conditions
for Kosovar Asylum-Seekers, 43 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 611, 620 (2010).
45. DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 153 (1999).
46. UN Handbook, supra note 39, at 161.
47. INS. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407,429 n.22 (1984).
48. Id. at 439.
49. UN Handbook, supra note 39, at 51.
50. Id. at131.3.
51. Begzatowski v. I.N.S., 278 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2002).
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listed types of actions that might constitute persecution, including illegal
searches, confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings and torture.52 The
Ninth Circuit has found past persecution where the asylum applicant has
received persistent threats to his life, property and business. Whether a
harm amounts to persecution is typically decided on a case-by-case basis,
taking into account all the facts with an understanding that "due to
variations in the psychological make-up of individuals and in the
circumstances of each case, interpretations of what amounts to persecution
",54are bound to vary.
Many asylum applicants escape from their home countries under
circumstances of great urgency.5 5 As the Seventh Circuit put it in Dawoud
v. Gonzalez, "[s]ome are literally running for their lives .... They often
have nothing but the shirts on their backs when they arrive in this
country."56  There, Ehab Dawoud, a member of an orthodox sect of
Christianity in Egypt, was targeted by the terrorist group al-Gama'a al-
Islamiyya after a video of Dawoud's wedding was shown in public.57 Three
members of the terrorist group came to Dawoud's home and took him to a
building outside of his city, where he was kept chained and underfed for ten
days.s On a separate occasion, the National Police of Egypt took Dawoud
to a police building and placed him in solitary confinement. 5 9 For three
days there, the officers would run water underneath Dawoud before
dropping an electrical device into the water to shock him.60 When he was
finally released, Dawoud and his wife immediately fled for the United
States.6'
After hearing Dawoud's testimony, the IJ denied his application for
asylum, noting that Dawoud was not credible and had failed to corroborate
his story with affidavits from relatives. 6 2 On appeal, the BIA agreed with
the IJ that Dawoud's failure to provide corroborating evidence disfavored
him, noting that Dawoud did not submit a translated copy of a handwritten
medical note, among other things.63 Dawoud's story is a prime example of
the types of circumstances that asylum applicants have undergone before
arriving in the U.S. In reiterating the rule that credible testimony alone may
52. Begzatowski, 278 F.3d at 669.
53. Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1996).
54. UN Handbook, supra note 39, at$ 52.
55. Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 278 F.3d 665, 669 612 (7th Cir. 2005).
56. Id at 613.
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be enough to satisfy an applicant's burden of proof, the Seventh Circuit in
Dawoud stated that, "[t]o expect these individuals to stop and collect
dossiers of paperwork before fleeing is both unrealistic and strikingly
insensitive to the harrowing conditions they face."4 Because the asylum
provisions of the Act only apply to new applications filed on or after May
11, 2005 and Dawoud's case was filed before this date, the Act did not
apply to him.65 Thus, the Seventh Circuit was able to decide Dawoud's
case based on his credible testimony alone-without corroborating
evidence.
Notwithstanding the impracticability of having access to corroborating
evidence, asylum seekers face a wide range of other difficulties in
presenting their claims before an adjudicator. One of these difficulties
involves the differences in cross-cultural communication. Studies have
shown that observers are typically unsuccessful in sensing deception from
relative strangers.66 Immigration judges and asylum officers are no
exception. This notion, coupled with the fact that certain behaviors are
indicative of falsity and disrespect in some cultures and not others, indicates
a strong possibility of asylum seekers being discredited for illegitimate
reasons. For instance, failure to maintain eye contact is considered a sign of
deception in Western cultures; in reality, the social significance of eye
contact varies from culture to culture.6 7 Additionally, an applicant may have
been taught in her home country to "volunteer nothing to people in
uniforms." 68 This belief may inhibit an asylum seeker from giving truthful
information to a border or customs agent, raising an issue of inconsistent
statements if the applicant later tells a different story to an asylum officer.
An even larger issue may exist where an applicant may not want to reveal
information due to a fear of reprisal from his persecutor at home, or a fear
that the applicant's family members who are still residing in his home
country would be put at risk.6 9 This reluctance may be the cause of various
missing parts in an applicant's testimony, casting doubt on the credibility of
I - 70a claim.
In many refugees' home countries, speaking against the government is
not only frowned upon, but would subject one to jail and torture.7 During
64. Dawoud, 424 F.3d at 613.
65. Id.
66. Joanna Ruppel, The Need for a Benefit of the Doubt Standard in Credibility Evaluation
ofAsylum Applications, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 12 (Winter 1991/92).




71. Ilene Durst, Lost in Translation: Why Due Process Demands Deference to the Refugee's
Narrative, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 127, 154 (2000).
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an asylum proceeding, this is precisely what a refugee must do if he has
been persecuted by his own government. This cultural barrier can be
particularly difficult to overcome, particularly where the individual has
experienced first-hand torture for actions taken in opposition to his home
country's government. What is more, any hearing, whether "nonadversarial
as before the asylum officer ("AO") or adversarial before an IJ, creates
stress which fosters behavior that is likely to be interpreted as deceptive.n
These instances are only a small sample of the numerous differences in
communication norms that exist among cultures. In addition to facing
cross-cultural dissimilarities that may be extremely harmful to their claims,
asylum seekers have the heavy burden of telling a consistent story to the
adjudicator.7 3  Internal consistency is one of the primary factors
contributing to an U's credibility assessment.74 This often poses an uphill
battle because "memories of trauma survivors have proven to resist verbal
linear storytelling."75 Memories of trauma in human beings are usually
fragmentary and lack context. Some scholars have even questioned
whether such physical and emotional pain caused by persecution is
expressible at all, suggesting that words could not possibly convey such
77tragic experiences. Physical violence and intense feelings of danger or
threat may force a victim to concentrate solely on the immediate situation
and ignore hunger, pain, or exhaustion. In the midst of horrific detention
or torture, victims who are simply trying to survive are unlikely to be
wholly cognizant of their surroundings-assuming that they even know
where they are. Traumatic events tend to produce profound psychological
effects on human beings. A traumatized person may remember every detail
of the event without emotion, or may have intense emotions relating to the
event without clear memory of it.79 Torture can also manifest itself in
subtle physiological ways, including a loss of hearing or inattentiveness.80
Moreover, an asylum applicant may seem generally uncomfortable in his
seat while telling his story, for the mere human reason of having to relive a
devastating event. An adjudicator may misunderstand such behavior to be
an indicator of dishonesty or fabrication of lies. It may be unrealistic and
callous to expect a victim of relatively recent torture to relay his story in a
completely articulate and sensible manner.
72. Lost in Translation, supra note 71, at 155.
73. Kagan, supra note 27, at 371.
74. Id
75. Durst, supra note 71, at 150.
76. Id. at 149.





Psychological barriers can even further inhibit an applicant from
prevailing on her claim when they are combined with cultural
misunderstandings. For instance, an asylum seeker may seem suspiciously
indifferent when telling her story, casting a shadow of doubt on her own
credibility. For example, it is common for a woman suffering from Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder to appear
withdrawn and detached.81  This is frequently referred to as the "flat
effect."8 2 From a Western perspective, this lack of emotion may signify
that the applicant is not telling the truth, because the story being told is one
that is normally expected to cause a serious emotional reaction.83
Therefore, it is often the case that the torture that the applicant is attempting
to prove created the very obstacle that prevents him from proving it.
Unfortunately, adjudicators rely on these very characteristics (resulting
from experiencing traumatic events) in finding a lack of credibility in
asylum applicants.84 In Mwembie v. Gonzalez, the Fifth Circuit condemned
an IJ's "incorrect and irrational assumptions about human behavior and
especially the behavior of people from foreign cultures, such as her
assumptions about a victim's ability to remember phone numbers, about all
aliens' behavior in saying good-bye to their families before fleeing, or
about the 'incomprehensible' brutality of the persecutors."85  Any
conclusions about an applicant's credibility based on these factors would be
both insensitive and nonsensical. Not only may an IJ misinterpret various
behaviors from an applicant to signify dishonesty, applicants also
frequently misunderstand IJs. An asylum proceeding often requires the
help of an interpreter due to a language barrier between the applicant and
the adjudicator. Cultural relativity of notions and concepts may distort
communication, even with an accurate interpreter.86 Asylum seekers are
likely to misunderstand, due to a disconnect in cultural norms or lack of
effective interpretation, questions or requests that an IJ asks of them. In
turn, this would cause an IJ to misconstrue the applicant as one who is
trying to dodge a question or is unable to provide basic information about
his case.
In seeking asylum, applicants are already in a vulnerable state. Such
vulnerability is sometimes exacerbated by the intimidating experience of
being before an immigration judge in a process that could result in their
81. Katherine E. Melloy, Telling Truths: How the REAL ID Act's Credibility Provisions
Affect Women Asylum Seekers, 92 IOWA L. REV. 637, 653 (2007).
82. Id
83. Id. at 654.
84. Durst, supra note 71, at 149.
85. 443 F.3d 405, 413 (5th Cir. 2006).
86. Walter Kalin, Troubled Communication: Cross-Cultural Misinterpretation in the Asylum
Hearing, 20 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 230, 233-238 (1986).
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removal from the U.S. and return to their home country. These
circumstances make it particularly difficult for applicants to appear
credible. IJs can contribute to the applicant's intimidation by asking
aggressive questions. For instance, in Fiadjoe v. Attorney General, Ms.
Fiadjoe was seeking asylum in the U.S. after escaping religious slavery in
West Africa.8 The IJ questioned Ms. Fiadjoe in an abusive tone about
details regarding sexual abuse by her father when she was seven years old .
The IJ spoke in an aggressive manner, drilling Ms. Fiadjoe about extremely
minor details of her claim that her father forced her into religious and
sexual slavery. 89 The IJ ultimately found her to be incredible, with the BIA
affirming the IJ's decision.90 On review, the Third Circuit found that an
adverse credibility assessment based on a hearing conducted under these
circumstances "could not survive review." 91 Noting that Ms. Fiadjoe was
experiencing Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and postpartum depression,
the court of appeals went on to state that, "[i]f not by design, in effect, [the
IJ] produced the very atmosphere that ... would cause memory loss,
blocking, dissociating and breakdown." 92 The Third Circuit remanded the
case so that it could be heard by a different Ij.93
Although most asylum hearings do not present an atmosphere that is
nearly as egregious as the one in Ms. Fiadjoe's case, individuals in
immigration proceedings tend to feel understandably intimidated. Being
forced to tell one's personal traumatic story in front of foreign authorities
can be a particularly difficult task. The stakes are extremely high in every
asylum proceeding, adding increased pressure to a situation that is already
stressful. This predicament, when considered along with the numerous
other factors that make asylum hearings challenging for applicants,
provides one explanation as to why applicants face considerable adversity
in seeming credible in front of an IJ.
87. Fiadjoe v. Atty Gen. of the U.S., 411 F.3d 135, 14245, 154 (3d Cir. 2005).
88. Daniel Forman, Improving Asylum-Seeker Credibility Determinations: Introducing
Appropriate Dispute Resolution Techniques Into the Process, 16 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
207, 208 (2008).
89. Fiadjoe, 411 F.3d at 142.
90. Id. at 145, 149.
91. Durst, supra note 71, at 157.
92. Id. at 154.
93. Forman, supra note 88, at 209.
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III. The REAL ID Act
a. Credibility
Congress passed the REAL ID Act in 2005, amending the INA in
several ways.9 4 One of the primary purposes of the Act was to eliminate
fraudulent asylum claims and thereby prevent terrorists from using asylum
as a means of access to the U.S. 95 For the first time in US history, the Act
set into law uniform credibility guidelines to be applied in asylum cases. 96
While there were clear criteria in case law for credibility prior to the Act,
adjudicators operated without statutory credibility guidelines. The Act
contains a credibility provision that changed the manner by which
credibility determinations are rendered in administrative proceedings and
how they are reviewed by federal appellate courts. The provision states,
in part:
[A] trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor,
candor or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent
plausibility of the applicant's or witness's account, the consistency
between the applicant's or witness's written and oral statements
(whenever made and whether or not under oath, and considering the
circumstances under which the statements were made), the internal
consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements
with other evidence of record (including the reports of the Department of
State on country conditions, and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such
statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or
falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant's claim, or any other relevant
factor.99
Before passage of the Act, most IJs and federal circuit court judges
only upheld adverse credibility determinations based on "issues that [went]
to the heart of the applicant's claim and not on irrelevant inconsistencies or
inconsistencies that could not be viewed as attempts by the applicant to
enhance his claims of persecution."'00 There were no standards set by
statute for how adjudicators were to determine an applicant's credibility-
factors to be considered simply came from the BIA and federal case law.' 0
The provision in the Act includes all of the factors previously relied upon
94. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 101, stat. 302 (2005); INA §
208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2009).
95. Ana Maria Barton, A Turn for the Worse: Is There Any Hope for a "Benefit of the
Doubt" Standard In Asylum Credibility Assessments Post-REAL ID Act?, 19 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 211, 218 (2009).
96. Id. at 213.
97. Id
98. Forman, supra note 88.
99. Id.
100. Barton, supra note 95, at 218.
101. Id
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by Us, but organizes these factors under a totality of the circumstances
test.102 Under the Act, adjudicators are to consider the totality of the
circumstances in making and reviewing credibility determinations.103 This
language gives more discretion to adjudicators in determining the
credibility of asylum applicants. In her article, In Terrorism and Asylum
Seekers: Why the REAL ID Act Is a False Promise, Marisa Silenzi
Cianciarulo expresses caution that the "careless" drafting of certain asylum
provisions in the Act could lead to unnecessarily stringent interpretations
that would deny protection to those who are eligible for it.104 Cianciarulo
explains that because the Act codified much existing case law regarding
asylum proceedings, it should not cause a major change in asylum
adjudications or how they are reviewed.
Although the credibility provision of the Act may seem to vary little
from the pre-2005 common law guidelines followed by IJs and federal
courts, there is a striking difference between the two standards.
Specifically, the Act allows for any inaccuracies in an applicant's account
to be taken into consideration in the credibility determination, "without
regard to whether the inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the
heart of the applicant's claim."' 05 Prior to the Act, inconsistencies that did
not enhance an applicant's claim had "little to no bearing on an applicant's
credibility.',10 6 That is, only inconsistencies central to a claim could be
considered in an adverse credibility finding. In most federal circuits prior
to 2005, if an inconsistency did not go to the heart of a claim, it was
insufficient to support an adverse credibility finding.'0 7
b. Corroboration
In addition to its credibility provision, the Act also contains a
corroborating evidence provision that deviates from pre-2005 common law.
This section, titled "Sustaining burden," states, in relevant part:
The testimony of an applicant may be sufficient to sustain the applicant's
burden without corroboration, but only if the applicant satisfies the trier
of fact that the applicant's testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers
to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.
In determining whether the applicant has met the applicant's burden, the
trier of fact may weigh the credible testimony along with other evidence
of record. Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant should
provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such
102. Id. at 220.
103. Id.
104. Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum Seekers: Why the REAL ID Act Is a
False Promise, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 101, 115-16 (2006).
105. 8 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2009).
106. Ruppel, supra note 66, at 10.
107. Barton, supra note 95, at 220.
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evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have the
evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence. 08
Before the Act, there was no definitive standard for determining
whether and when corroborating evidence was required to support an
applicant's testimony.109 Still, the BIA and all circuit courts agreed that
while the failure to provide corroboration might affect an applicant's
credibility, a lack of corroboration alone could not justify an adverse
ruling."10  Although BIA and circuit courts all agreed that credible
testimony alone could, in some cases, suffice to sustain an applicant's
burden of proof, there was disagreement as to when personal testimony
alone satisfied the burden of proof, and when an adjudicator could
appropriately ask for corroboration.
In establishing new corroboration requirements under the Act,
Congress solidified the common law notion that under some circumstances,
credible testimony without corroboration will be sufficient to successfully
present a claim."' Although the law still provides that credibility can be
established by testimony alone, recent case law has suggested that few
applicants are able to do this." 2 The provision goes on to mandate that an
applicant "must" provide evidence deemed reasonably available by the
adjudicator.1 3 If an applicant fails to produce this evidence, he can only
prevail if he can show that corroboration is not available to him, and that he
cannot reasonably obtain it.1 4 The Act thus gives heightened emphasis on
corroboration, as opposed to former case law urging adjudicators to
consider as just one factor whether all available evidence has been
presented." This shift adds to an already heavy burden that asylum
applicants must bear.
The Act's corroboration requirements add two necessary factual
determinations for the adjudicator: whether corroborating evidence exists
and whether corroborating evidence is reasonably available." 6 This inquiry
requires additional expertise on the part of the adjudicator regarding
conditions of applicants' countries of origin, yet illogically does not provide
108. 8 U.S.C. § I 158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2009).
109. Gregory Laufer & Stephen Yale-Loehr, Straining Credibility: Recent Developments
Regarding the Impact of the REAL ID Act on Credibility and Corroboration Findings in Asylum
Cases, 12 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 74, 76 (2007).
110. Barton, supra note 95, at 222.
111. Id. at 220.
112. Melanie A. Conroy, Real Bias: How Real Id's Credibility and Corroboration
Requirements Impair Sexual Minority Asylum Applicants, 24 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 1,
47 (2009).
113. Barton, supra note 95, at 224.
114. Id
115. Id.
116. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii) (2009).
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for expanded training, additional financial or educational resources, or time
for decision-making.117
III. Proposed Amendments to the REAL ID Act
The heightened burden that asylum applicants must now meet to
prevail on their claims have made things more difficult for legitimate
asylum seekers. While nearly all laws must advance some purpose at the
expense of others, a law must be reconsidered when it poses significant
potential harm to thousands of people seeking refuge from persecution.
The amendments to the INA implemented by the Act may prevent
legitimate victims of persecution from seeking refuge more than it has
decreased the number of prevailing fraudulent asylum claims. Although
this claim is speculative and its truth would be impossible to ascertain, it is
not unrealistic.
In allowing adverse credibility findings based on inconsistencies that
do not go to the heart of an applicant's claim, the Act gives adjudicators
overly broad discretion. While Congress has articulated that credibility
findings must be reasonable and rational, the Act's amendments allow for
unreasonable decisions. An adverse credibility finding relying on minor
inconsistencies that do not go to the heart of the applicant's claim is, by its
very nature, unreasonable. Jibril v. Gonzalez is a prime example of an
unreasonable credibility determination based on minor inconsistencies.'"s
Jibril was a member of a minority clan in Somalia.' '9 An IJ found that his
testimony was not credible due to an inconsistency between his statement
that he was pretending to be dead when members of a militia raided his
house, and his statement that he was able to see the types of weapons the
soldiers were carrying.12 0 The IJ also noted that Jibril testified at one point
that his father only said he would take the family to Kenya but not to any
place in particular, yet at a later point Jibril said that his father did indicate
that he was taking the family to Nairobi.' 2 ' The Ninth Circuit, in analyzing
the record, noted that Jibril's testimony was not inconsistent and merely
misunderstood, or at most, it was inconsistent with regard to trivial facts
that did not go to the heart of his asylum claim.' 2 2 The appellate court
ultimately concluded that these inconsistencies could not support an IJ's
adverse credibility determination.' 2 3
117. Conroy, supra note 112, at 26.
118. 423 F.3d 1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 2005).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1134.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1134-35.
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Similarly, in Ai Yu Li v. Gonzalez, an IJ found that Li's testimony
lacked credibility based on minor inconsistencies. 124 Specifically, the IJ
cited several discrepancies in Li's testimony: whether her abortion
procedure lasted thirty minutes or forty to fifty minutes, whether she had
provided a urine sample to a doctor, whether she had been fined after the
birth of her second child, and whether her husband's parents had been
arrested.12 5 In stating that there was no substantial evidence in the record to
support an IJ's finding that Li's testimony lacked credibility, the Second
Circuit stated that because these inconsistencies were relatively minor and
isolated, they should not have been fatal to Li's claim.' 26
Asylum applicants are unlikely to remember every excruciating detail
of their stories. In fact, it may be the case that those who have suffered
from the most egregious harm are the ones who will have the most trouble
remembering what exactly happened to them. Many of those who have
experienced torture or other forms of persecution suffer from Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder as well as other mental ailments that further
inhibit detailed recollection of past events. Some applicants are only able to
properly tell their story after obtaining legal and psychiatric assistance.' 2 7
The difficulties facing asylum seekers described in Part II are only the tip of
the iceberg when it comes to the challenges that applicants must face.
Due to the often insurmountable challenges behind seeking asylum in
the US and the strong likelihood that survivors of persecution will not be
able to recall every detail of their stories, the Act should be amended so that
a trier of fact may not base a credibility determination on any inaccuracies
or falsehoods without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or
falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant's claim. Jibril and Ai Yu Li
illustrate how the Act as it stands may allow an IJ to make an unreasonable
and inaccurate credibility determination. Furthermore, a trier of fact should
only be able to require corroboration when the applicant is not deemed
sufficiently credible, and when the corroboration pertains to facts central to
the applicant's claim. Such amendments would take into consideration the
harsh psychological barriers and cultural misunderstandings that asylum
seekers inherently face.
Under the Act as it stands, IJs are given far more discretion than
necessary in adjudicating claims. Although most are thoughtful and skilled
in making credibility determinations, IJs have gained a reputation over the
past few years for careless and "insensitive adjudication."'128 This fact,
124. 177 Fed. Appx. 100, 102 (2006).
125. Id. at 101.
126. Id.
127. Melloy, supra note 81, at 639.
128. Id. at 640.
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coupled with federal appellate courts' increasing deference to IJs'
credibility findings, render the Act to be a fatal barrier to some asylum
seekers.129 Amending the Act would create a systemic change that gives IJs
more guidance in adjudicating claims. The amendments would promote
greater consistency in claim adjudication across immigration courts and
asylum offices across the U.S., giving each applicant an equal opportunity
to prevail regardless of the state or region in which he is located.
The Act, even with the proposed Amendments, would still advance the
interests of Congress in increasing national security and reducing the
number of fraudulent asylum applications. An adjudicator would still be
permitted to take into consideration inconsistencies of an applicant's story
under the "totality of the circumstances" test, so long as he did not base his
overall credibility determination on any inconsistencies that did not go to
the heart of the claim. By the same token, an adjudicator would still be
permitted to ask for corroboration, so long as personal testimony alone is
not sufficient and the corroboration pertains to facts central to the
applicant's claim.
In addition to these changes within the Act, training for asylum
officers and IJs on psychological and cultural barriers that commonly apply
to asylum applicants would allow them to more accurately determine an
applicant's credibility. Although every new asylum officer must complete a
five-week basic training course and every regional office conducts four
hours of training per week for all its officers on new legal issues, country
conditions, and procedures,13 0 changes in training would be beneficial to
both the system and those who must navigate it. Asylum officers should
receive specific training on psychological issues that arise from
experiencing trauma. Asylum officers and IJs should also be given more
time to make decisions, if need be. Cases of such far-reaching
repercussions should never be rushed. Adjudicators would be able to more
efficiently assess claims if they had the tools to understand the applicant's
background and state of mind. Training on proper interview techniques and
on how to ensure a safe environment for an applicant would also improve
truth-seeking. The UN Handbook advises that in order for an adjudicator to
exercise his duties property, he must earn the applicant's trust and
confidence.13 1
129. Melloy, supra note 81, at 641.
130. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60
STAN. L. REV. 295, 311 (2007).
131. UN Handbook, supra note 39, at $ 52.
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Conclusion
The US is not alone in facing the inherent difficulties of making
credibility determinations of asylum seekers.' 32  The international legal
community faces the same issues when adjudicating refugee claims.133
However, the UN Handbook encourages giving refugees the "benefit of the
doubt" due to the great difficulty of producing corroborative evidence. 134
The notion of a "benefit of the doubt" is protection-oriented and sensitive to
the struggle resulting from persecution.
In passing the Act, Congress advanced the legitimate goal of carefully
screening any noncitizen who is seeking to establish residency in the US.
However, such a goal must take into account the ever-standing obligation of
making domestic law consistent with the 1967 United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, which obligated countries to protect
refugees on their territory.13 5 Amending the Act so that adjudicators may
not rely on immaterial consistencies in making adverse credibility
determinations would still advance truth seeking and protection from
fraudulent asylum claims, while giving adjudicators less room to make
unsupported decisions. Allowing IJs to require corroboration only where
the applicant is not deemed sufficiently credible, as well as when the
corroboration pertains to facts central to the applicant's claim and is
reasonably available would also promote fewer unsupported decisions by
adjudicators. These amendments, in addition to overall increased
recognition of the cultural, psychological, and practical barriers that
applicants must face, would take into consideration the harsh effects of
persecution, while still safeguarding national security.
132. Nicole S. Thompson, Due Process Problems Caused by Large Disparities in Grants of
Asylum: Will New Department ofJustice Recommendations Solve the Problem?, 22 EMORY INT'L
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